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1. General introduction 
International humanitarian law (IHL, also referred to as the law of war/armed conflict) is one of 
the oldest substantive areas of regulation under international law. As Sir Christopher Greenwood 
has noted, 
… laws on the conduct of hostilities have existed in most cultures for hundreds, if not 
thousands, of years–rules prohibiting the use of certain weapons or prescribing the 
treatment of prisoners, for example, can be traced back to classical times–and 
international law has contained a law of war from the start.1 
What is more, IHL has been present at many of the significant milestones in the modern history 
of public international law. It was with respect to war, for example, that many of the earliest 
multilateral treaties were adopted in the latter part of the nineteenth century.2 It was also the laws 
of war (alongside arms limitations and pacific settlement of disputes) on which the two Hague 
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 focused, which had a profound impact on subsequent 
international conferences and the settlement of disputes throughout the twentieth century.3 In a 
similar way, the expansion of international law after the Second World War to regulate certain 
intra-State matters was realised, in part, in the field of armed conflict through the extension of 
conventional IHL to internal conflicts between States and non-State armed groups.4  
This key place of the law of war in the historical development of the broader field of public 
international law is explained, in large part, by the relatively few specialised, substantive areas of 
regulation in international law at the time. Much has, of course, changed in this regard, given that 
over the last seventy years international law has expanded dramatically, now boasting a hugely 
diverse array of specialised fields.5 This potentially has consequences not only for the role of any 
single specialised field (such as IHL) in driving developments within public international law, but 
also on the scope of enquiry of much scholarship, which is now far more restricted as a result of 
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the growing specialisation of each specific field within international law. Regarding IHL in 
particular, it has been remarked that this specialisation has resulted in it becoming  
… one of the most highly focused areas of public international law and has hastened 
its omission from contemporary debate. Indeed, most general public international 
lawyers (if any truly still exist) would only claim a basic understanding of humanitarian 
law and, as such, are slower to engage with it than perhaps other sub-genres within the 
international legal order.6 
It is against this background that this special issue of the Journal of Conflict & Security Law explores 
the place of IHL within public international law, both historically and today. As a topic of enquiry, 
this is, of course, embedded within the rich and diverse literature on the fragmentation of 
international law.7 The overall aim of this issue is to consider how certain norms of general 
international law that apply across specialised fields (such as those regulating law creation, treaty 
interpretation, and State responsibility) have operated, or indeed evolved, in the field of IHL.8 This 
is an under-explored topic, and it is to be contrasted with the literature that explores the 
relationship between IHL and other specialised regimes of public international law, whether 
international human rights law (IHRL),9 international refugee law,10 or international investment 
law.11 It is, instead, closer in its approach to the edited collection by Professors Menno Kamminga 
and Martin Scheinin on the impact of human rights law on general international law, a result of 
the work on the topic by the International Law Association’s Committee on International Law and 
Practice.12  
The articles in this special issue are the product of papers presented and commented upon at a 
two-day roundtable that was co-convened by ourselves and held at the University of Exeter in 
September 2016.13 The topic of that roundtable was, similarly to the Kamminga and Scheinin 
project, the impact of the law of armed conflict on general international law. However, in light of 
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the discussions, for the purposes of this special issue, the topic has been expanded to consider the 
relationship between the law of armed conflict and general international law more broadly.  
The papers that follow thus all serve to explore the place of IHL within the broader field of 
pubic international law. By considering how a range of general international law issues regarding 
sources, State responsibility, and structural concepts such as State sovereignty arise in the specific 
field of IHL, a rich and complex relationship between IHL and general international law is 
revealed. Depending on the particular area, this relationship varies quite considerably, with a wide 
spectrum of different possibilities: first, in some areas, and consistent with the claim made above 
concerning its historical place, IHL has played a key role and impacted upon the development of 
general international law;14 second, IHL has functioned as a vital testing ground for certain general 
international law concepts;15 third, IHL and general international law have influenced one another 
symbiotically in particular respects;16 fourth, IHL and general international law have diverged quite 
markedly in one particular respect;17 and fifth, IHL has contributed a more nuanced understanding 
of certain general international law concepts, creating possibilities for change in the future.18  
Before moving on to an overview of each article in this special issue, one further theme should 
be noted that can be drawn out of all of these contributions taken together. This concerns the 
prominent role of non-State actors in IHL. The nature of IHL is such that much of its operation 
concerns non-State actors, including individuals as protected by its norms and non-State armed 
groups as bound by them. This necessarily means that the operation of certain general international 
law concepts in the field of IHL might be affected by the prominent role of non-State actors in 
that field. Indeed, a number of the articles in this special issue show how this feature of IHL might 
affect the relationship between this specific regime and general international law.19 The importance 
of non-State actors as rights-holders in other fields, such as human rights law and investment law, 
and calls to extend international law obligations to non-State actors beyond the limited fields in 
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non-State actors); Bartels (n 14) (on the fundamental importance of obligations for non-State armed groups under 
IHL for the concept of State sovereignty). 
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which this has already occurred,20 means that such conclusions are likely to extend beyond IHL, 
whether presently or in the future.21  
 
2. Overview of the contributions 
As noted, each article explores a different issue at the intersections between IHL and general 
international law. The first two contributions to this symposium consider particular aspects of the 
sources of law, and in the first article, Dr Katherine Fortin explores the tensions between the 
seemingly conflicting values of unity and diversity of international law.22 Her focus is on custom 
as one of the two principal sources of international law.23 In that regard, she notes that the 
generality of customary international law is an ‘important legal glue that joins and unifies the 
international community of States’.24 However, she qualifies that statement at the outset by 
observing that the idea of unity that supposedly undergirds customary international law is in reality 
multifaceted.  
In particular, strict unity would mean that a single class of actors (i.e., States) create and are bound 
by a single class of rules (i.e., customary international law): in Dr Fortin’s terms, there would be a 
unity of law-makers, a unity of duty-bearers, and a unity of norms.25 However, there is little doubt 
that in a number of areas of international law, the purported unity of duty-bearers has been severely 
disrupted by the emergence of a diverse range of non-State actors. For instance, organized armed 
groups are generally considered to be bound by customary (and conventional) IHL.26 In other 
words, such entities now count among the duty-bearers, even though they most decidedly are not 
States. But does this streak of emerging diversity affect the other two ‘unities’?  
With regard to the unity of norms, Dr Fortin demonstrates that it would be anachronistic to 
insist that all customary rules must have an identical legal effect on all actors with international 
personality. Again, IHL offers a fertile ground to test this hypothesis and Dr Fortin lists a number 
of customary rules which apply to States and non-State armed groups in different ways.27 But at 
least in a certain sense, the unity of norms can nonetheless be said to have been preserved: the 
growing number of non-State entities bound by international law has not changed the fact that 
States still have ‘the same general obligations to each other under general customary international law’.28  
By contrast, States are much more resistant to any attempts to dilute the unity of law-makers. 
In this regard, Dr Fortin traces the debates on the propriety of accepting the practice and opinio 
juris of non-State actors for the purposes of custom formation. Her conclusion, based on a detailed 
analysis of the nature and conduct of armed groups, is close to the orthodox position: non-State 
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actors are too diverse, too disunited, and too transitory for their practice to be counted as 
equivalent to that of States. However, there is a nuance to be added. On the basis of her analysis 
of the role of armed groups in the creation and implementation of IHL, Dr Fortin cautions that 
we must find a way to involve non-State actors in shaping those norms that bind them—as 
otherwise we might jeopardize the authority and legitimacy of international law.29 
* * * 
The following contribution, continuing with the theme of sources, is authored by Dr Vito 
Todeschini who examines the impact that IHL has had on the development of the principle of 
systemic integration under general international law.30 The principle of systemic integration, as 
codified by Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), requires 
that the interpretation of treaties must take into account ‘[a]ny relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’.31 Dr Todeschini explores the interaction between 
the relevant developments in IHL and the evolution of this principle under general international 
law. 
In doing so, he engages in a detailed assessment of international jurisprudence that has invoked 
a variety of rules of IHL. His analysis reveals that the principle has been relied upon by a wide 
range of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies including the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights, 
and the International Criminal Court. Although not all of the studied decisions expressly refer to 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, they all share the idea that the relevant context of a given provision 
in a treaty is broader than the treaty of which it forms a part or even than the area of international 
law to which the treaty is said to belong.32 
Dr Todeschini’s analysis further confirms the close interplay between IHL and IHRL and offers 
a valuable contribution to our understanding of the relationship between these two areas. In that 
regard, he shows that international tribunals have used the principle in one of two mutually 
exclusive ways. Specifically, they have either done so to amplify the reach of human rights norms 
by finding a corresponding IHL norm that pulls in the same direction (convergent use)—or to 
avoid a potential norm conflict by prioritizing the rule of IHL that happens to be in tension with 
a rule of IHRL (divergent use).33 
Dr Todeschini’s article addresses the overarching aim of this special issue by identifying the 
specific forms of impact that the application of IHL in international jurisprudence has had on the 
general principle of systemic integration. The first of these is that these decisions have 
reinvigorated the principle after years of languishing and relative disuse. Today, there is a wealth 
of case-law illuminating our understanding of the principle, and much of it is related to IHL. 
Secondly, many of these cases have applied the principle in situations going beyond the traditional 
inter-State context foreseen by Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. In Dr Todeschini’s summary, this 
therefore suggests that developments in the area of IHL may have broadened the principle of 
systemic integration beyond its codified formulation.34 
* * * 
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The next three contributions examine the relationship between IHL and the law of State 
responsibility. The first is Dr Marco Longobardo’s article, which explores the presence of 
obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes in IHL.35 The notion of obligations erga omnes was 
originally recognized by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Barcelona Traction as a specific 
category of international obligations that a State may owe to ‘the international community as a 
whole, in contradistinction to a traditionally bilateralised understanding of international law.36 
Importantly, the notion was subsequently adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 
its 2001 Articles on State Responsibility.37 The derived phrase ‘erga omnes partes’ refers to those 
obligations that are owed collectively to a group of States, typically because they are all parties to 
the same multilateral treaty.38  
Dr Longobardo builds on this conceptual framework to argue that the notion of obligations 
erga omnes (partes) has been tried and tested in the field of IHL. He shows that core IHL treaties 
contain provisions that can be seen as comprising obligations erga omnes partes or even—insofar as 
the rules in question have crystallized into customary international law—obligations erga omnes.39 
These include the obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions;40 the 
obligations related to the system of Protecting Powers;41 the obligation to refrain from resort to 
belligerent reprisals against protected persons and objects;42 and others.43 On Dr Longobardo’s 
analysis, what unites all of these provisions is that they indicate a non-bilateralised understanding 
of IHL that protects shared interests of the international community, with the concomitant 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole as opposed to States individually.44  
He further examines relevant State practice regarding reactions to putative violations of IHL. 
This empirical overview catalogues a wide array of cases in which States not qualifying as ‘injured 
States’ (as that term is understood under the law of State responsibility) nonetheless invoke the 
responsibility of the wrongdoing State, resorting to the toolkit of responses available under the 
secondary rules. This analysis supports Dr Longobardo’s claim that all States have a legal interest 
in compliance with IHL, which is in line with the designation of many IHL rules as comprising 
obligations erga omnes (partes).45 Overall, Dr Longobardo’s piece provides an important example of 
a central concept of international law having been developed, in part, in the burgeoning field of 
IHL.  
* * * 
Mr Remy Jorritsma’s article provides a fresh look at an issue that has been vexing international 
lawyers for almost two decades.46 Specifically, he examines the interplay between IHL and general 
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44 Ibid __. 
45 Ibid __. 
46 See Jorritsma (n 17). 
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international law regarding State responsibility for the conduct of proxy actors in time of armed 
conflict. It is well-known that two different legal tests have emerged in the international 
jurisprudence in this regard. While the ICJ established in Nicaragua the more demanding test of 
effective control,47 a line of cases of the ICTY that goes back to Tadić has advocated a less stringent 
test of overall control,48 resulting in lamentations that the law on point has become irreconcilably 
fragmented.49 
Mr Jorritsma’s main contribution is in his creative reinterpretation of the dilemma at the heart 
of the issue. Although he has to (and does) choose a side in the debate, he argues that the two 
positions are much less irreconcilable than many of their proponents have come to believe. He 
sides with those who take the view described in the article as one of ‘functional equivalence’, i.e. 
that rules on attribution must be coterminous with the determination of conflict characterisation 
under IHL.50 This is to be contrasted with the ‘functional differentiation’ approach, according to 
which the distinction between primary and secondary rules of international law means that the 
tests for attribution and conflict classification may be (and in fact are) different, because they serve 
fundamentally different functions under international law.51 
Accordingly, Mr Jorritsma’s position is that if the control that the outside State wields over a 
proxy actor is sufficient to make that State a party to an international armed conflict (IAC), then 
that same level of control is also sufficient for the purposes of attribution of the conduct of the 
proxy actor to the State. He argues that this follows from the very ‘close connection’ that exists 
between the two sets of rules in question.52 He further posits that this reasoning shows that both 
courts were right to a degree: the ICTY in identifying a test that avoids a ‘responsibility gap’ and 
the ICJ in requesting that the test for conflict qualification be anchored in the primary rules of 
IHL.53 Not everyone will agree, of course, and the debate is likely to continue.54 However, scholars 
and practitioners will have to grapple with Mr Jorritsma’s compelling reconciliation of the two 
legal tests. 
In broader terms, this article also demonstrates that while the relationship between IHL and 
general international law may frequently bring the two bodies of law very close, this need 
necessarily not result in the impact of the former on the latter. Specifically with respect to the 
requirement of control under international law, Mr Jorritsma sums up that the less stringent overall 
control test developed in the context of IHL has not transcended the boundaries of that body of 
law. Rather, on his view, that test amounts to a lex specialis55 applicable solely to situations governed 
by IHL and without a direct impact on the general law of State responsibility.56 
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48 Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) [131]; see also Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Trial 
Judgment) IT-95-14/2-T (26 February 2001) [115]; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 
December 2004) [361]; Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović (Trial Judgment) IT-98-34-T (31 March 2003) [198]; Prosecutor 
v Prlić et al (Trial Judgment) IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) vol 1 [86(a)]. 
49 See, eg, M Koskenniemi and P Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 LJIL 
553, 564–67. 
50 Jorritsma (n 17) __. 
51 Ibid __. 
52 Ibid __. 
53 Ibid __. 
54 One of the present authors has recently argued elsewhere in favour of decoupling the law of State responsibility 
from conflict qualification under IHL: see K Mačák, Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law (OUP 2018) 
44–47. 
55 See ILC ASR (n 37) Art 55. 
56 Jorritsma (n 17) __. 
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* * * 
The next article, authored by Dr Antal Berkes,57 then turns to the notion of due diligence, the 
classical understanding of which places it at the outer bounds of the law of State responsibility.58 
In other words, even if particular injurious conduct is not attributable to a State, that State may 
still be responsible for its own failure to prevent or punish that conduct—i.e., for failing to comply 
with its obligation of due diligence.59 Against this backdrop, Dr Berkes’s article explores the impact 
that IHL has had on the development of the standard of due diligence in international law. 
At the outset, he shows that the modern-day concept of due diligence can be traced back to 
specific IHL-based obligations of neutral States and occupying powers originating in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries.60 This analysis provides an important historical context to our understanding 
of this standard and its role in modern international law. Dr Berkes argues that once the standard 
had been established in general international law, it then influenced the interpretation of those 
rules of IHL that impose due diligence obligations, the first and foremost among them being the 
obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL.61  
He further analyses factors that determine the required degree of due diligence in a given 
situation, including territorial control, influence over the acting entity, and available technical 
capabilities. In this regard, he contends that IHL has ‘deterritorialized’ due diligence in the sense 
that it has extended the standard to situations in which States control foreign territory (e.g. during 
belligerent occupation).62 Overall, Dr Berkes recognizes that the interplay of these factors leaves 
States with considerable flexibility in performing their obligations. However, he argues that States 
must always do so by respecting what he describes as ‘the raison d’être’ of that flexibility, namely the 
aim to alleviate human suffering during armed conflict.63 
Finally, he examines the range of duty-bearers who are subject to the due diligence obligations. 
Although due diligence has traditionally been understood as a corollary of State sovereignty,64 Dr 
Berkes shows that many obligations under IHL now impose the standard also on non-State actors 
including individuals, organized armed groups, and international organizations, and he explores 
the different legal effect that due diligence has on these entities as contrasted with States.65 All in 
all, his article shows the potential for cross-pollination between IHL and general international law 
through the lens of a single yet highly adaptable legal concept.  
* * * 
While State sovereignty has featured prominently in several of the preceding articles, the final 
contribution by Mr Rogier Bartels makes this concept its focal point.66 Specifically, Mr Bartels 
explores the relationship between the notion of sovereignty and the development of IHL. His 
                                                          
57 Berkes (n 14). 
58 See generally RY Jennings and A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, Longman 1992) 549–54. 
59 See, eg, Janes et al (USA) v United Mexican States (1925) 4 RIAA 82, 86 (‘[I]f a State shows serious lack of diligence in 
apprehending and/or punishing culprits, its liability is a derivative liability, … rendering the State responsible for the 
very consequences of the individual's misdemeanor.’). 
60 Berkes (n 14) __. 
61 Ibid __; see also GCs, Common Art 1; AP I, Art 1(1); J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2005) rule 139. 
62 Berkes (n 14) __. 
63 Ibid __. 
64 See, eg, Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v USA) (Award) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 839 (‘Territorial sovereignty … involves 
the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within 
the territory the rights of other States[.]’). 
65 Berkes (n 14) __. 
66 Bartels (n 14). 
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overall argument is that the gradual process of introducing constraints to State sovereignty has 
been strongly catalysed by the conduct and outcome of armed conflicts. 
Mr Bartels begins by noting that the enduring distinction in IHL between IACs and non-
international armed conflicts (NIACs) corresponds to the two main facets of sovereignty: while 
States agreed to constrain their external sovereignty by adopting extensive rules governing inter-
State wars, they were much less willing to allow international law to encroach on their internal 
sovereignty in quelling domestic uprisings.67  
However, in Mr Bartels’ retelling, the history of war is a history of growing limitations on States’ 
freedom to conduct themselves as they please. The main milestones are well-known: the 
prosecution by Germany of its own nationals for violations of IHL after World War I; the adoption 
of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions in 1949; the growth of treaty rules specifically 
applicable in NIACs during the Cold War;68 the ‘revolutionary’ Tadić ruling in 1995;69 and so on. 
He then adds two newer case studies, exploring the impact on sovereignty that was brought about 
by the recent erosion of the requirement of consent to humanitarian assistance and by the 
emerging concept of ‘transnational armed conflict’.70 
Overall, Mr Bartels’ principal contribution is in linking each of these historical developments 
with the changing notion of sovereignty, and this panoramic view allows him to draw the 
conclusion that even though States have gradually accepted many new limitations, they have 
simultaneously succeeded in preserving the key importance of sovereignty itself. On that basis, he 
summarizes that although it would be too soon to sound the death knell for sovereignty, one 
cannot deny the transformation that this concept has undergone in the recent past, much of it 
effectuated precisely by developments in the area of IHL.71 
 
3. Concluding remarks  
It was noted at the outset that there is a disconnect between the historically central role of IHL in 
the development of public international law and the now vast diversification of specialised areas 
of international law. The articles in this symposium have sought to elaborate on this by considering 
the relationship between IHL and certain fundamental features of general international law. 
Together, they reveal a fascinating and complex web of interactions between IHL and public 
international law, that is, between the specific and the general.  
This analysis is very much intended as a starting point rather than an exhaustive review. In 
addition to offering insight into this relationship, it is hoped that it will also encourage an 
integrationist approach to IHL and many of the most pressing issues in the regulation of armed 
conflict. In so doing, one can then recognise IHL’s place as firmly embedded within public 
international law and thus benefiting from a well-developed normative environment that can 
additionally provide insight into issues arising across different fields. 
                                                          
67 Ibid __. 
68 See, in particular, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (signed 12 December 1977, entered into force 7 
December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609.  
69 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995). 
70 Bartels (n 14) __. 
71 Ibid __. 
